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THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF STATE AND
LOCAL IMMIGRATION REGULATION:
COMMENTS ON OLIVAS AND

HOLLIFIELD, HUNT & TICHENOR
Karen Engle*

Oside,

N September 26, 2007, the New York Times reported that River-

New Jersey had rescinded its year-old ordinance penalizing

anyone who employed or rented to an undocumented immigrant. The ordinance had apparently been too successful in its attempt to
decrease the number of undocumented residents, with consequences few
of its supporters had imagined:
Within months, hundreds, if not thousands, of recent immigrants
from Brazil and other Latin American countries had fled.
With the departure of so many people, the local economy suffered.
Hair salons, restaurants and corner shops that catered to the immigrants saw business plummet; several closed. Once-boarded-up
storefronts downtown were boarded up again.
Meanwhile, the town was hit with two lawsuits challenging the law.
Legal bills began to pile up, straining the town's already tight budget.
Suddenly, many people-including some who originally favored the
law-started having second thoughts.
"I don't think people knew there would be such an economic burden," said Mayor George Conard, who voted for the original
ordinance.'
But apparently not everyone relented. Some residents continued to support the ban, even with its negative economic consequences. 2 Charles
Hilton, the former mayor who had backed the ordinance explained: "It
* Cecil D. Redford Professor in Law & Director, Rapoport Center for Human
Rights and Justice, University of Texas. Thanks to George Martinez and the SMU Law
Review for facilitating an enriching symposium, and to James Hollifield and Michael Olivas for the panel discussion at the symposium. I am also grateful to Josh Clark and Barbara Hines for their comments on an earlier draft of these remarks and to Matthew Dunlap
and Christine Turner for their research assistance.
1. Ken Belson & Jill P. Capuzzo, Towns Rethink Laws Against Illegal Immigrants,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2007, at Al.
2. Id. ("Some residents who backed the ban last year were reluctant to discuss their
stance now, though they uniformly blamed outsiders for misrepresenting their motives. By
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changed the face of Riverside a little bit.... The business district is fairly
vacant now, but it's not the legitimate businesses that are gone.... It's all
the ones that were supporting the illegal immigrants, or, as I like to call
them, the criminal aliens."'3 For the former mayor, it would seem, businesses owned, operated by, or even with a clientele of undocumented
residents are to be compared with illegal drug or other criminal
enterprises.
I would like to use the papers presented by Michael Olivas4 and James
Hollifield 5 to consider whether the forces behind the Riverside ordinance, the operation of the ordinance itself, the rescission of it, and the
reaction to the rescission are best characterized as "political" or "economic." Both papers offer us entry points into this question. In particular, the papers account for, in very different ways, economic and noneconomic political factors that have historically fed and continue to feed
into immigration policy at the federal level (Hollifield) 6 as well as the
state and local levels (Olivas). 7 Both papers make significant contributions in a number of areas, but I will try to bring them together around a
discussion of their understandings of the extent to which political versus
economic factors drive immigration. I am interested both in the different
ways the political and economic interact in the context of immigration
policy and in what gets labeled "political" as opposed to "economic."
As a starting point, it should be noted that comparing the papers is
difficult at one very basic level. Hollifield's immigration flow data only
legal forms of immigration, while Olivas's paper considers ways in which
state and local entities treat their residents that are presumed to be undocumented. In this sense, the Riverside discussion ties in more directly
to Olivas's paper. Yet, I hope to suggest some ways in which these two
papers nevertheless speak to each other in the context of considering Riverside and similar cases.
It seems to me that political and economic arguments were made on all
sides of the debate in Riverside. Sometimes the economic and political
interests were aligned (and inextricably intertwined). Other times, they
were in tension, so that one had to forego an efficient market position to
maintain a restrictionist position on immigration. I have to admit that I
enjoy watching efficient market/restrictionist advocates struggle with the
contradiction that sometimes surfaces in their position.
and large, they said the ordinance was a success because it drove out illegal immigrants,
even if it hurt the town's economy.")

3. Id.
4. Michael Olivas, Lawmakers Gone Wild? College Residency and the Response to

Professor Kobach, 61 SMU L. REv. 99 (2008).

5. James F. Hollifield, Valerie F. Hunt & Daniel J. Tichenor, The Liberal Paradox:

Immigrants, Markets and Rights in the United States, 61 SMU L. Rnv. 67 (2008). James
Hollifield presented the paper at the conference on behalf of his colleagues. When I reference Hollifield in the text, I am referring to this jointly authored paper.
6. Id. at 68-71.
7. Olivas, supra note 4, at 105-06.
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While in Dallas for this symposium, I conducted a few informal interviews with some Anglo residents of the Dallas metroplex about the recent and controversial ordinances in the nearby municipalities of Farmers
Branch and Irving.8 Speaking of the Farmers Branch ordinance, one Dallas resident told me: "All it does is prevent apartment owners from renting to illegal aliens." He and another person continued to explain to me
how-based on their own anecdotal evidence, from a relative who works
in an emergency room-"illegal aliens" use the vast majority of the area's
public services, at least emergency health services.
One of the people with whom I was speaking is a CPA at a large accounting firm and considers himself to be a fiscal conservative. I decided
to appeal to his pro-business side. I asked whether he believed that landlords should have their property rights trammeled in such a way. I also
asked if he had heard about what had happened in Riverside, New Jersey.
He was at first surprised to hear that Riverside had rescinded its ordinance. But, when he heard the economic reasons for the decision, he
immediately understood. As I began to make headway, he said he could
now understand why President Bush is, as he put it, so "far to the left" on
immigration. I discussed with him how Bush was supported in his guestworker proposal by many with business interests. I used some of what I
had read in Hollifield's paper to explain some of the unpredictable alliances formed around and against certain immigration policies. Another
person chimed in that "Texas would die without illegal immigrants." By
the end of the conversation, it seemed my interviewees were questioning
the utility and efficiency of ordinances such as those in Farmers Branch. I
even had them considering how, if employers were required to provide
insurance to their undocumented workers, the workers would not need to
resort to the emergency room for everyday health issues. Providing benefits for such jobs, I suggested, might in fact have the consequence of making those same jobs more appealing to non-immigrant workers, thus
reducing economic pull factors for people to cross the border.
It appeared that my appeal to pro-business interests had worked. But
there is a way in which I always feel a bit disingenuous about making that
appeal. It downplays important substantive issues both about labor exploitation and about why it is so often assumed that human rights, including the guarantee of basic health services, should be dependant upon
which side of any given border one might have originated. Although I
8. The Farmers Branch ordinance requires landlords to verify citizenship or legal immigration status before renting to potential tenants. Landlords are subject to up to $500 a
day for violations of the Ordinance. See Farmers Branch, Tex., Ordinance 2892 (Nov. 13,
2006). While Farmers Branch set up a system much like employer sanctions, placing the
burden of enforcement on private agencies, the City of Irving ordinance attempts to enforce immigration laws more directly. See Press Release, City of Irving, Irving Partners
with ICE Through 24/7 CAP, available at http://cityofirving.org/news-articles/24-7-CAP.
html (creating a "partnership between the Irving Police Department and the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agency. Under the program, Irving jailers notify
federal officials if they have an arrested person who may be in the country illegally. If ICE
makes a reqjvest, the prisoner is held on their authority.").
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was able to slip both of those issues into the discussion about emergency
health services, it was clear that such overt arguments were unlikely to be
persuasive to this audience. I did not say what I think I believe, which is
that, even were it not efficient or pragmatic, we should have open borders, or at least openly porous borders. 9
Both Hollifield and Olivas offer lenses into this tension between my
instincts to make anti-restrictionist arguments on political and justice
grounds, on one hand, and economics on the other. I do not want to
suggest, of course, that the economic is not political or vice versa. Hollifield and Olivas would likely agree that economic factors have different
political importance for different actors.
By analyzing the correlation between certain economic factors (unemployment and GDP) from 1891 to 2003 and legal immigration flows, Hollifield and his co-authors conclude that U.S. immigration policy has had a
significant impact on such flows after World War II.10 They demonstrate
this impact by noting increasing legal immigration-facilitated by Congressional action-even in certain periods of economic downturn in the
United States.11 Their paper then delves into an analysis of the roll-call
votes in Congress on major immigration legislation in 1965, 1986 and
1990, comparing the results to those on civil rights and trade legislation
12
from the same periods.
The paper does important work that only statistical models can do. By
holding GDP and unemployment levels as constants, it is able to consider
the extent to which those factors seem to affect legal immigration flows
(which are generally a result of U.S. policy decisions). 13 My concerns
with the analysis stem from the limitations of statistical models. Economic factors almost certainly affected immigration openness and restrictions during the years the authors suggest prior to World War II, but they
cannot easily be separated from "political" factors such as xenophobia
fueled by religious, ethnic, and racial bias against particular groups of
immigrants. Indeed, sometimes it was the apparent success of certain
groups during otherwise economic hard times that fueled restrictions. Direct and indirect discriminatory measures against Chinese immigrants in
14
the late nineteenth century are particularly poignant.
9. I am sympathetic to most of Kevin Johnson's proposals in Kevin Johnson, Opening
the Floodgates: Why America Needs to Rethink Its Immigration Laws, 61 SMU L. REV. 3
(2008), as well as to distributional justice arguments that the U.S. is largely responsible for
economic and social conditions that encourage the flow of migration to the north. For the
latter argument, see, e.g., Larry van der Linden & Josh Clark, Economic Migration and
Justice, 18 INT'L J. APPLIED PHIL. 45 (2004).
10. Hollifield, Hunt & Tichenor, supra note 5, at 80.
11. Id. at 80-83.
12. Id. at 89-94.
13. Id. at 72-78.
14. For discussion of two such examples, see The Chinese Exclusion Case, Chae Chan
Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 589-604 (1889) (upholding the Chinese Exclusion Act
of 1882), and Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886) (striking down a San Francisco
ordinance used to refuse permits to Chinese-owned laundries). Although Hollifield's statistical analysis does not begin until 1891, similar dynamics continued after that date. See
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Further, Hollifield admits that the statistical analysis is limited by its
exclusive focus on the flows of legal immigration. 15 This focus potentially
distorts the analysis. As Linda Bosniak reminded us shortly after the passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 ("IRCA"), undocumented immigrants have for many years played an important role in
the United States polity:
Undocumented immigrants ... have long occupied a unique, deeply
ambivalent place in the United States. Despite their vital place in the
American economy, this country has deprived them of recognition as
members in most contexts, but it has also extended them such recognition in others .... They are both outsiders and members, regulated
and subjects of membership in limited
objects of immigration control
16
but important respects.
More than not attending to undocumented immigration flow, the statistical data provided by Hollifield and his co-authors also do not take into
account all attempts to curb immigration, particularly undocumented immigration. IRCA legislation, for example, expanded legal immigrationin part by legalizing large numbers of people already in the United
States-but it was also quite restrictionist in terms of future (undocumented) immigration. 17 Indeed, IRCA was a compromise between those
favoring and those opposing amnesty; 18 employer sanctions were put into
the bill in large part to protect the future of jobs for U.S. workers by
attempting to stem the tide of new immigrants. 19 In their coding of the
Act and correlation of it to trade legislation from the same time period,
however, Hollifield and his co-authors treat IRCA as legislation20 that
demonstrates that those who voted for it were "for" immigration.
Were the restrictionist rather than legalization tendency attended to, it
might appear that economic pressures played more of a role than the data
otherwise suggest. Hollifield and his co-authors are not unaware of this
possible reading:
Economic stagnation and decline in the United States and other receiving countries in the 1970s brought renewed pressure for lower
levels of immigration. Yet the push-pull model could not anticipate
formidable political resistance from a number of strategically-situated lawmakers and special interests, like the growers in California
and the Southwest, who supported large-scale immigration and who
postponed policy action during economic hard times by brokering
support for a bipartisan commission to study immigration-the SeKaren Engle, Constructing Good Aliens and Good Citizens: Legitimizing the War on Terror, 75 CoLo. L. REV. 59, 60-71 (2004).
15. Hollifield, Hunt & Tichenor, supra note 5, at 87-88.
16. Linda S. Bosniak, Exclusion and Membership: The Dual Identity of the Undocumented Worker Under United States Law, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 955, 956.
17. Catherine L. Menino, Compromising Immigration Reform: The Creation of a Vulnerable Subclass, 98 YALE L.J. 409, 424 (1988).
18. Id. at 409.
19. Id. at 410.
20. Hollifield, Hunt & Tichenor, supra note 5, at 90.
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lect Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy.21
In fact, I would argue those economic pressures from the 1970s made
their way into political arguments in favor of restricting future immigration in the 1980s. Moreover, this part of Hollifield's piece suggests the
need to consider the different economic needs of various parts of the
country, something for which his model does not fully account.
Considering various measures that state and local entities have taken
to attempt to affect immigration flows, Michael Olivas's paper sheds light
on the extent to which attitudes and policies toward immigration and immigrants are in fact often local and regional. 22 Nearly all local measures-whether restrictionist or pro-immigrant-respond to what their
proponents see as federal trends that are either too lax (and therefore
must be enforced or enhanced at the local level) or too draconian (and
therefore must be avoided through the locality serving as a safe haven, or
sanctuary, for immigrants). 23 Most of these measures are aimed at the
24
treatment of undocumented workers and residents.
Olivas focuses the majority of his paper on post-secondary education,
refuting challenges to decisions by some states to grant in-state residency
to undocumented residents. While he notes that most of the states that
have granted residency are "major immigrant-receiving states such as
Texas, California, Illinois, New Mexico, and New York," other statesNebraska, Kansas, Oklahoma and Utah-have done so as well, which he
finds surprising. 25 Even though he does not explicitly mention economic
push/pull factors, the assumption seems to be that at least states with high
levels of undocumented immigration have increased economic incentives
to provide education to the children of undocumented residents.
For the most part, however, Olivas does not overtly discuss economic
factors. Indeed, if Hollifield's paper is in part a call for those who better
wish to understand immigration flows to consider non-economic political
factors that lead to restrictionist as well as liberal immigration policies,
Olivas's paper is a partial response. In considering "the sharp rise" in
numbers of local and state bills aimed at restricting immigration, he attributes them to "issues of perceived terrorism threats, overburdened locales, well-publicized and highly polarized federal failures in immigration
enforcement," as well as to Lou Dobbs, Bush's fall in approval ratings,
26
and anti-Mexican sentiment.
In fact, a number of people have attempted to identify the precise factors that determine whether states and localities are likely to pass restrictive or pro-immigrant laws (if either). A recent study by S. Karthick
Ramakrishnan and Tom (Tak) Wong suggests that political factors21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id. at 81.
Olivas, supra note 4, at 101-03.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 114-15.
Id. at 104-05.
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"most notably partisan composition and the politicization of national immigration reform legislation at the local level through protests and rallies"-correlate most strongly with both pro-immigrant and restrictive
state and local legislation. 27 Although these factors are the most empirically significant in terms of whether proposed ordinances pass, the study
by Ramakrishnan and Wong shows that some economic factors, such as
the extent to which Blacks are disadvantaged in relationship to Latinos,
28
suggest the likelihood that a restrictive ordinance will be proposed.
to pass in areas where a
Moreover, restrictionist policies are more likely
29
large percentage of jobs are in agriculture.
Olivas does consider economic factors in response to two of Kris
Kobach's arguments against residency status for undocumented post-secondary education students. Kobach argues that the ability to attend college is a pull-factor in immigration and that granting tuition benefits to
undocumented students costs
the state millions of dollars. 30 Olivas is not
31
persuaded by either claim.
Kobach's pull-factor argument suggests that in-state tuition encourages
individuals to enter the country illegally so that they or their families can
obtain such a benefit. 32 Olivas states that Kobach takes this position "despite evidence to the contrary," but Olivas does not himself cite the contrary evidence. 33 Olivas suggests that Kobach and his allies are in fact
motivated by a "[feeling] that the students should not benefit from their
parents' actions."'34 Olivas responds with similar incredulity to Kobach's
second argument with regard to the cost incurred by states, which Kobach
further maintains violates the provision of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 ("IIRIRA") that prohibits states from granting certain postsecondary education "benefits" to
aliens "not lawfully present in the United States."'35 Olivas reads the statute so as not to prohibit the granting of tuition residency by claiming that
the benefit is "non-monetary. ' 36 He argues that because "[t]o educate an
undocumented student costs a state or institution no more than it does to
educate a native born citizen or other non-resident," Kobach "miscon27. S. KARTHICK RAMAKRISHNAN & TOM (TAK) WONG, IMMIGRATION POLICIES Go
LOCAL: THE VARYING RESPONSES OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS TO UNDOCUMENTED IMMIORATION 22 (Nov. 9, 2007), http://www.law.berkeley.edu/centers/ewi/Ramakrishnan&

Wongpaperfinal.pdf
28. See id. at 20 ("Higher levels of black disadvantage relative to Latinos is associated
with a slightly higher likelihood of proposing restrictionist legislation. These results are in
line with Claudine Gay's (2006) findings in Los Angeles neighborhoods, where economic
competition between blacks and Latinos erodes African American support for policies
favorable to Latinos.").
29. Id.

30. Kris Kobach, Immigration Nullification: In-State Tuition and Lawmakers Who Disregard the Law, 10 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 473, 477, 517-21 (2006-07).
31. Olivas, supra note 4, at 101-03.
32. Kobach, supra note 30, at 498-503.
33. Olivas, supra note 4, at 114 n.58.
34. Id. at 115.
35. See id. at 120-22 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1623 (1999)).
36. Id. at 122-23.
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strues both the transaction and the prohibition. ' 37
Although I agree with Olivas that residency status should be granted
without regard to documentation and that the statute is unclear with regard to its prohibition of "benefit," I believe that it should be clarified by
subsequent legislation, such as the DREAM Act. I am not as certain as
Olivas that IIRIRA only refers to direct monetary benefits or that there
are no monetary costs (or losses) connected to providing such residency
status. 38 Providing resident status for the purpose of admission and tuition purposes grants a privilege to certain individuals. It often does so,
however, based on an understanding that the students have paid for part
of their education in other ways through, for example, the taxes they and
their parents have paid over the years. I wonder if an argument that inresident tuition does not entail a "benefit" might better be made on these
grounds: that the status is meant, in effect, to give credit to the contributions that students and their families have otherwise made to the state.
This is not to say that a state could not make more (or lose less) money
by denying resident tuition to a group of students such as those who are
undocumented. Assuming a given state would permit the admission of
the same student but require her to pay out-of-state (or more likely even
the generally higher foreign) tuition, the same state would receive fewer
real dollars by granting her residency. Or, if the state school refused to
admit undocumented students, it might give that same spot to a non-resident, thereby receiving more tuition. While states differ in their policies
regarding the distribution of resident and non-resident students, these
scenarios would be accurate in at least some of the cases.
I disagree with Kobach, however, to the extent that he argues that
there are only economic costs, not gains, to states that grant in-state residency. Post-secondary schools compete for the best and brightest graduates of secondary institutions, and the granting of state residency is an
incentive for top students in the state to attend state public schools. Indeed, in-state tuition is often provided to a variety of non-state resident
students that state universities would like to attract. A refusal to grant
this benefit to undocumented students who would otherwise qualify for
admission would presumably come at a cost to the school if the student
were to choose not to attend.
Moreover, recall Olivas's lack of surprise that states with large undocumented populations have provided residency status without regard to
documentation. 39 I suggested that the lack of surprise comes at least in
37. Id. at 125.
38. For Olivas, "benefit" in the statute "refers to dollars" because of the statute's reference to "amount, duration, and scope." See Olivas, supra note 4, at 124 (discussing section 505(a) of the DREAM Act, which states "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of
law, an alien who is not lawfully present in the United States shall not be eligible on the
basis of residence within a State (or a political subdivision) for any postsecondary education benefit unless a citizen or national of the United States is eligible for such a benefit (in
no less an amount, duration, and scope) without regard to whether the citizen or national is
such a resident." 8 U.S.C. § 1623(a) (1999)).
39. Olivas, supra note 4, at 114-15.
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part from some attention to economic incentives on Olivas's part. States,
of course, believe they will do better economically in the long run with a
well-educated citizenry. 40 This rationale is one that figured prominently
in the Supreme Court's decision in Plyler v. Doe, in which the Supreme
Court found it unconstitutional for states not to require primary and secondary education to undocumented children. 4 1 In the majority opinion,
Justice Brennan wrote:
It is difficult to understand precisely what the State hopes to achieve
by promoting the creation and perpetuation of a subclass of illiterates within our boundaries, surely adding to the problems and costs
of unemployment, welfare, and crime. It is thus clear that whatever
savings might be achieved by denying these children an education,
they are wholly insubstantial in light of the costs involved to these
children, the State, and the Nation. 42
Certainly, the consequences of failing to receive a post-secondary education are not nearly this dire. Yet, we know there is a positive correlation
between education levels and income, 43 so that education levels and usage of needs-based public services are generally inversely correlated.
Even states that benefit from large numbers of undocumented workers in
the informal economy would seem to see the advantage in ensuring that
the next generation, the one almost certain to stay in the United States
and ultimately participate in the formal economy, is a beneficiary of
higher education. Of course, the tighter the enforcement of immigration
law, the less likely it is that the state will be able to benefit from the
education achieved by these students. This realization at least partly explains support for the DREAM Act, even by many legislators who are
not normally considered "pro-immigration."
In addition to arguing for an interpretation of IIRIRA that does not
prevent resident tuition for undocumented residents, Olivas posits a constitutional line between permissible and impermissible state and local
measures affecting immigration. Based primarily on decided cases, including one of which Olivas was on the losing side (in Virginia), his line
would allow, but not require, states to grant resident status for post-secondary education purposes to undocumented state residents. 44 In general, it would permit cities and counties to provide benefits to its
undocumented residents when "purely state, county, or local interests are
governed and if federal peremptory powers are not triggered," and the
40. See, e.g., SANDY BAUM & KATHLEEN PAYEA, EDUCATION PAYS 2004: THE BENEFITS OF HIGHER EDUCATION FOR INDIVIDUALS AND SOCIETY 14 (rev. ed. 2004), available
at http://www.collegeboard.com/prod-downloads/press/cost04/EducationPays2004.pdf;
JENNIFER CHEESEMAN DAY & ERIC C. NAIBURGER, THE BIG PAYOFF: EDUCATIONAL
ATTAINMENT AND SYNTHETIC ESTIMATES OF WORK-LIFE EARNING (2002), available at

http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/p23-210.pdf.
41. 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982).
42. Id.
43. BAUM & PAYEA, supra note 40, at 14. Of course, immigrants, particularly undocumented immigrants, might be an exception to this rule.
44. See Olivas, supra note 4, at 105-06.
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policies "are not subterfuges for replacing exclusive federal authority."45
He concludes his paper with a policy argument: "[W]hen I count the
rise of immigration-related proposals at the local and state level, I am
convinced that no good can come of these." 46 He reads the existing ordinances as "sure signs of an ethnic and national origin 'tax' that will only
be levied upon certain groups, certain to be Mexicans in particular, or
'47
equally likely, Mexican Americans.
While it is hard to disagree that these ordinances have-and are intended to have-effects on particular groups of undocumented residents
(with the target groups varying depending upon geography), this argument does not address the larger political questions that Olivas claims
motivate the move toward local ordinances:
Like a fugue playing in the background, the issue in play here [with
regard to postsecondary residence] is the inchoate permission to participate in the U.S. polity and cultural life that Plyler represents. And
with the torrent of state legislation related to immigration, it is clear
that the larger polity is as concerned with these localized conditions
as is Professor Kobach. As the best indicator of this trend, the National Conference of State Legistures ("NCSL") gathers and analyzes immigration legislation data, and it has recorded that, in the
first half of 2007, hundreds of immigration-related bills had been introduced
in state legislatures and hundreds had been enacted in most
48
states.
If in fact the question here is about citizenship and membership, I wonder
if Olivas does not sweep too broadly (or perhaps narrowly) with his constitutional analysis. He seems to believe that local governments can do
very little to grant greater membership rights than the federal government permits. In the symposium, Olivas objected to the use of the term
"sanctuary cities" insisting it is a misnomer used to malign the refusal of
municipalities to cooperate with federal officials in ways that Olivas
49
would sometimes consider unconstitutional.
Yet, some state and local governments have in fact been quite creative
in terms of creating membership opportunities for their residents who
might not be documented, such as providing them with voting rights for

45. Id.
46. Id. at 130.
47. Id. at 131.

48. Id. at 101 (citing

NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON STATE LEGISLATURES,
LEGISLATION RELATED TO IMMIGRANTS AND IMMIGRATION (Aug. 6, 2007),

2007

STATE

http://www.

ncsl.org/programs/immig/2007ImmigrationUpdate.htm).
49. Michael A. Olivas, Remarks at the Immigrants and Immigration Reform: Civil
Rights in the 21st Century Symposium (Oct. 19, 2007).
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51
local elections, 50 supporting and helping to regulate day-labor sites,
52
working with banks to issue ATM cards, offering identification cards to
city residents regardless of their immigration status,53 and making employers criminally liable for failing to pay workers. 54 A number of economic and non-purely economic factors weigh into these decisions, but I
support such policies and would like to encourage them because of their
basic respect for the human rights of the recipients, regardless of whether
they are economically efficient for the municipalities and employers.
The work of Hollifield and his co-authors and recent debates around
proposals for guest-worker legislation and another round of amnesty indicate that federal policies in the area of immigration are unpredictable.
State and local governments can sometimes provide a progressive approach when federal policies unduly restrict or overly enforce immigration laws.
On the other hand, I read Bosniak's analysis of pre- and post-IRCA
legislation as a warning of the ways in which local and private employer
openness to undocumented workers functions in tandem with restrictive
laws on the books, often taking the pressure off the federal government
to enforce otherwise draconian immigration laws. Might state and local
governments unwittingly be legitimizing a system that both prohibits and
relies upon labor by undocumented workers? And might even discussions about membership and citizenship both ignore the extent to which

at least many Mexican workers need cross-border mobility? 55 Finally,

50. Takoma Park, Maryland, was one of the first municipalities to permit non-citizen
voting. The ordinance prohibits inquiries into citizenship. See Takoma Park, Md., Municipal Code 9.04 ("Rights of Non-U.S. Citizens in Takoma Park"). The same statute prohibits inquiries into citizenship. See id. at 9.04.020, available at http://www.takomaparkmd.

gov/code/TakomaParkMunicipalCode/index.htm. For general information on non-citizen voting initiatives, see http://immigrantvoting.org/material/about.html.
51. Several cities throughout the United States have opened day labor centers, where
typically-undocumented immigrants wait to be picked up for jobs. Cities that operate day
labor centers include Garland, Fort Worth, and Plano, Texas, and Herndon, Virginia. Dianne Solis, Day Labor Sites are Hot Spots in Immigration Fight, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,

Mar. 5, 2007; N.C. Aizenman & Timothy Dwyer, Words Fly at Day-Laborer Center in
Herndon, WASH. POST, Dec. 15, 2005, at B01.
52. In Austin, Texas, the local police department led the effort to convince banks to
accept alternative forms of identification for opening bank accounts. ANNA PAULSON ET
AL., FINANCIAL ACCESS FOR IMMIGRANTS: LESSONS FROM DIVERSE PERSPECTIVES 64
(2006), http://www.brookings.edu/metro/pubs/20060504_financialaccess.pdf.
53. In November, 2007, the City of San Francisco approved a program to provide residents, regardless of immigration status, identification cards that "qualify them for health
services at city-run clinics, public library privileges and resident discounts at museums and
other cultural institutions." Associated Press, San Fran OKs ID Cardfor Immigrants, Nov.
28, 2007.
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might the economies of many developing countries benefit more from
workers who bring back skills they have learned and honed in the United
56
States than they do from remittances?
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